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ISSUES .PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE Did the Court err in finding that a 
partnership existed between the parties. 
ISSUE 2: If a partnership did exist was defendant 
obligated to provide the money while plaintiff was only obligated 
to provide "services." 
ISSUE 3: Did the court err in distributing the 
proceeds from the sale of the property on an equal basis or 
should defendant first be reimbursed for the obligations he 
incurred and contributions he made in excess of any made by 
plaintiff. 
ISSUE 4: If a partnership existed did plaintiff 
breach the terms of that partnership. 
ISSUE 5: Is it appropriate for the courts in this 
state to grant a legal status to a private arrangement substitut-
ing for the institution of marriage. 
ISSUE 6; Should equity reward plaintiff for her 
deleterious conduct and if so, in what amount? 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
Section 48-1-3 "Partnership" defined. A partner-
ship is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners a business for profit. 
Section 48-1-4 Rules for determining the existence 
of a partnership. In determining whether a partnership exists 
these rules shall apply 
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(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in commonf tenancy by en-
tireties , joint propertyf common property, or part ownership, 
does not of itself establish a partnership whether such co-owners 
do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property 
• • • 
Section 48-1-15 Rules determining rights and duties 
of partners. Text appears in the Addendum. 
Section 48-1-37 Rules for distribution. Text 
appears in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
i. . rf 
Although this case received a "D" designation from 
the Salt Lake County Clerk, it is not a divorce action. 
Plaintiff originally filed for divorce alleging a common 
law marriage in Galveston, Texas. R. 2-3. Plaintiff later 
amended her complaint claiming, additionally, that there was a 
partnership with defendant and asked for an accounting and 
dissolution. R. 19-37. Defendant answered and counterclaimed 
denying the existence of both the common-law marriage and the 
partnership but alleged that if there was a partnership defendant 
-3-
should have judgment against plaintiff for the amount by which 
his contributions exceeded hers. R. 41-49, 160-164. Thereafter 
plaintiff amended her complaint a second time and alleged that a 
common law marriage had occurred either in Texas, Pennsylvania, 
Montana or Colorado, but she was apparently not sure just where. 
R. 835-836. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim of a 
common-law marriage, no cause of action, but found that there was 
a partnership relating to certain parcels of real property pur-
chased after the parties commenced residing in the State of Utah. 
The court determined that plaintiff's obligation to the partner-
ship was to provide only services but that the defendant was 
obligated to provide all of the money. The Court ordered the 
real property sold and the proceeds used to pay off some, but not 
all, of the mortgages relating to those properties; the balance 
of the funds, if any, were to be divided equally between the 
parties. R. 1082-1083. The Court ordered the partnership 
terminated and the properties divided as of March 11, 1985, the 
date of the court's memorandum decision. R. 938-940* T. Vol. 
Ill, p. 11-12. Defendant appeals from the court's finding of a 
partnership and the resulting distribution. Plaintiff appeals 
from the court's denial of her claim of a common-law marriage. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff and defendant commenced living together 
in Galveston, Texas in August, 1971 while both were students at 
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the University of Texas. At that time plaintiff was unemployed 
and remained so throughout her association with defendant in 
Texas. The agreement between the parties was to share expenses 
and utilities. T. Vol. I, p. 6-8. Although within a few weeks, 
a sexual relationship developed, the parties1 agreement did not 
change. T. Vol. I, p. 44. In the spring of 1972, plaintiff re-
ceived his medical degree and moved to Philadelphia. Plaintiff 
subsequently graduated in Occupational Therapy and joined defen-
dant in Philadelphia after residing for several months in 
Indianapolis. Plaintiff obtained employment as an occupational 
therapist, defendant was employed as a medical doctor. T. Vol. 
I, p. 120. Thereafter, the parties pursued their individual 
careers in Pennsylvania, Montana, Arkansas and Colorado before 
coming to Utah. T. Vol. II, p. 105-106. Defendant arrived here 
in December, 1975; plaintiff in early 1976. While in Utah the 
parties continued to pursue their separate careers. T. Vol. II, 
p. 105, 128, 137, 286. Plaintiff, however, became dissatisfied 
with being an occupational therapist and in the spring of 1978, 
changed her career to that of a realtor. She made her first real 
estate sale in the "latter part of 1978." T. Vol. I, p. 70-71. 
Since then she has been highly successful in that field. T. Vol. 
I, p. 152. After arriving in Utah, the parties commenced 
Plaintiff described her relationship with defendant at that 
point as "very heated". T. Vol. I, p. 8. 
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purchasing real property located primarily in this State. The 
property was originally titled in their joint names under an 
agreement, according to the defendant, wherein plaintiff was to 
provide either property or cash of an equal value as she became 
able to do so. T. Vol. II, p. 128, 305. A portion of the pur-
chase price was borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's 
professional corporation. T. Vol. IIy p. 132, 306; Ex. 94. The 
balance was either purchased by mortgage or contract. Although 
plaintiff initially managed some of the Utah properties, a 
professional manager was soon hired who assumed most of the 
responsibilities relating to the properties. T. Vol. I, p. 59. 
The parties continued to reside together until October 30, 1981. 
They had no children. T. Vol. I, p. 65. Throughout their 
association, defendant provided a substantial majority of the 
funds. T. Vol. II, p. 337, 338. After separation, defendant 
paid $146,247.00, to maintain the properties. T. Vol. II, p. 
172-173. Plaintiff paid only $4,200.00, T. Vol. I, p. 173, 
although during that same period of time she acquired substantial 
assets in her own name. T. Vol. I, p. 128-130, 135-136, 179-182. 
This action was filed in June, 1982. Defendant married his 
present wife in December, 1982 and now has one.son. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is no evidence that the parties intended to create 
a partnership; ratherr they were two college students who decided 
to live together• In any eventf the terms of the "partnership," 
as found by the court, are contrary to the law and are unsup-
ported by the record. 
The distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the 
property fails to conform with the statutes of this state and 
fails to give the defendant credit for his excess contributions 
and the personal obligations he incurred. 
An award to plaintiff based upon her cohabitation with 
defendant adversely impacts society and the institution of 
marriage. Since this state has abolished common law marriage and 
has refused "no fault" divorces it should not sanction private 
arrangements which substitute for the institution of marriage. 
The plaintiff contributed little to the arrangement, 
provided no "wifely duties" and actually enhanced her career 
through defendant. She amassed substantial assets in her own 
name while defendant was forced to expend his funds to acquire 
and then preserve the properties. Equity, therefore, should not 
reward plaintiff for her conduct. Rather, as a minimum, plain-




THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A PARTNERSHIP 
EXISTED BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
2 Since this is an equitable matter this Court may weigh 
the facts as well as the lawf Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 
(Utah 1981), West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965), 
and may set aside the judgment where the court has misapplied the 
law or its findings are clearly against the weight of evidence, 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). Defendant con-
tends that such is the case here. 
The court found that the parties were partners "under 
circumstances where each of the partners committed his or her 
total time, talent and efforts to the partnership." R. 1078. 
The court further found that, "it was understood and agreed that 
the plaintiff would devote all of her time and talents to the 
property and defendant would contribute money, but that both 
would share on an equal basis." R. 1079. Defendant submits that 
these two findings are internally inconsistent with one another 
and that neither are supported by competent evidence in this 
case. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court. 
Plaintiff asked for an equitable division of the properties 
and for an accounting, R. 35. See R. 4 28. 
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A#
 There was no association of a business for profit 
between plaintiff and defendants A partnership is defined, in 
the Uniform Partnership Act, as an "association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit," 
Section 48-1-3 U.C.A. That Act is in force in each of the States 
in which the parties cohabitated. See, e.g. Ark Stat, §65-106, 
C.R.S. §7-60-106; M.C.A. §35-10-201; 59 Pa. C.S.A. §311(a); 
Vernon's Ann-Tex. Civ. Stat. Art, 6132(b), §6. 
There was no written partnership agreement, T. Vol. I, 
p. 143, and plaintiff presented no evidence that the parties 
operated a business for profit. Plaintiff testified that the 
"agreement" began in Galveston in the early Spring of 1972, "the 
date or the evening that we went to see Bob Creason." T. Vol. I, 
3 
p. 144. Since plaintiff was an unemployed college student with 
no particular skills, however, there could not have been an in-
tent between the parties to carry on a business for profit in the 
State of Texas. Rather, as plaintiff admitted, the agreement 
between the parties was simply that they would share expenses. 
Plaintiff's version of the Creason meeting was that the 
parties were going to make "a committed relationship," be 
faithful to each other and "combine all of our financial 
resources and our emotional and our physical resources." T. 
Vol. I, p. 9-10. Defendant's version was that the Creason 
meeting was to discuss the social ramifications of the fact 
that they were living together without being married. T. 
Vol. II, p. 86-87. 
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T. Vol* I, p. 6, In order to create a partnership, however, the 
purpose of the association must be for gain. 1 S. Rowley on 
Partnerships §6.8, p. 88 (2d ed. 1960). Simply sharing expenses 
does not create a partnership. 
There was no evidence that the parties ever entered into 
an agreement that they would carry on a business for profit as 
co-owners in any of the other States in which they resided. The 
evidence merely showed that they continued to live together, 
share expenses and pursue their individual careers. 
Plaintiff appeared to be confused concerning where the 
"agreement" took place. She subsequently stated that the conver-
sation creating the "agreement" had initiated in Philadelphia and 
not in Texas as she had earlier testified. She stated: 
The conversation initiated in 
Philadelphia . . . it was our under-
standing, that all of our efforts, our 
financial efforts, our physical efforts, 
our intellectual efforts, were to be com-
bined so that we - - our unit could grow. 
It was for the betterment for both of us. 
T. Vol. I, p. 55. 
Rather than a business for profit, plaintiff testified that the 
objective of the living arrangement was tax savings, T. Vol. I, 
p. 20. When asked where she believed she had entered into the 
partnership, plaintiff responded, "I believe that our marriage 
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was our partnership." T. Vol. I, p. 121. 
Defendant submits that iff as plaintiff testified, their 
"marriage" was their partnership, the court should have found 
that there was no partnership since it found that there was no 
marriage. An agreement to live together and share expenses, 
standing alone, does not manifest the intent necessary to create 
a partnership. See, Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 164 N.J. Super. 162, 
395 A.2d 913 (1978). Since the evidence required to support a 
finding of a partnership is wholly lacking, that finding must be 
reversed. 
B. If any agreement existed it had to have been created 
in the State of Utah. The court found that the parties had 
acquired substantial real estate in the State of Utah and as to 
that property only found that they were partners. R. 1078. The 
court refused, however, to state where the partnership was 
formed. T. Vol. Ill, p. 14.5 
The parties had no intent to come to the State of Utah 
until late 1975. T. Vol. II, p. 117-119. In addition, plaintiff 
4 
Although plaintiff contended that defendant referred to her 
as "partner" she admitted that such a term was a nickname 
such as, "honey, darling, or my little cabbage." T. Vol. I, 
p. 122. Based on the court's ruling, defendant probably 
should be grateful that the court did not decree that he was 
also a cabbage. 
When asked where the partnership was formed, the Court 
replied, "Where? Some place between Texas and Utah. Don't 
think I have to make a finding on that." T. Vol. Ill, p. 14. 
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had no expertise in real estate until at least the latter part of 
1978, T. Vol, Iy p. 70. Thus, any agreement to acquire property 
in Utah must have occurred after the parties arrived here. 
The only testimony relating to a discussion concerning 
the acquisition of property in the State of Utah was presented by 
defendant* Defendant testified that there was an agreement among 
the parties that he would borrow the funds for the acquisition of 
the properties from his corporation's retirement trust, or supply 
his own funds, based upon plaintiff's promise to manage the 
property. Plaintiff further promised, according to defendant, 
that she would ultimately acquire sufficient properties with her 
own funds and place defendant's name on those properties or else 
pay defendant for half of the price of the properties so that 
their contributions would be equal. T. Vol. II, p. 128, 305. 
That testimony of defendant was never rebutted by plaintiff. 
Thus, defendant submits, the only basis upon which properties 
could have been acquired in Utah was pursuant to the conversation 
to which defendant testified. It would have been impossible in 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, Arkansas or Colorado for the 
parties to enter into the type of agreement characterized by the 
court since there was no intent at that time to come to Utah and 
plaintiff possessed no skills or expertise in the field of real 
estate. 
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C. The mere acquisition of property does not create a 
Partnership, The trial court apparently based its finding of a 
* 
partnership upon the "manner in which the parties purchased the 
properties" and by other documents which reflected their "common 
ownership." R. 1078. Joint tenancy or common ownership of prop-
erty, however, does not of itself establish a partnership 
whether or not profits made by the use of the property are 
shared. Section 48- l-4(2)f U.C.A. It is well established that 
two or more persons may be co-owners of land and not be partners, 
since co-tenancy of real property is not the same as a partner-
ship. 1 S. Rowley, supra, at 134. See, Clark v. Sidway, 142 
U.S. 682, 12 S.Ct. 327, 35 L.Ed. 1157 (1892). 
The Pennsylvania courts have stated that even though two 
people own property as joint tenants, in order to be a partner-
ship there must be an element of carrying on a business or 
enterprise for a profit. Comstock v. Thompson,. 286 Pa. 457, 133 
A. 638 (1926). See also, Laughner v. Wally, 269 Pa. 5, 122 A. 
105 (1920); Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa. 279, 29 A.2d 473 (1943). 
Rowley has further stated: "The test of sharing profits so far 
as they are derived from the use of property is not alone con-
trolling. 1 S. Rowley, supra at 133. In Brown v. Miller, 111 
Colo. 327, 141 P.2d 682 (1943), the court stated: "mere joint 
ownership of land does not create a partnership even though the 
profits are shared." 
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Merely owning property with another does not create a 
partnership; therefore, since the record is devoid of any other 
evidence that a partnership existed, the court's reliance upon 
the form of the title to the property is misplaced. 
II 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD DEVOTE ALL 
OF HER TIME AND TALENTS TO THE PROPERTY AND DEFENDANT 
WOULD CONTRIBUTE MONEY BUT THAT BOTH WOULD SHARE ON 
AN EQUAL BASIS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
As set forth above, the defendant contends that the 
Court's Finding No. 6, is inconsistent with its Finding No. 3. 
In addition, defendant submits that the Court's Finding No. 6 is 
totally unsupported by any evidence. 
A. The plaintiff, herself, did not contend that her 
obligation to the relationship was limited to time and talents 
only. The testimony of the plaintiff is replete with statements 
that her obligation, or commitment, to the relationship included 
a financial commitment. Although defendant had a different ver-
sion of his discussions with plaintiff, the court's finding that 
plaintiff was only required to devote her "time and talents" to 
the property but that defendant was obligated to contribute 
money, is contrary even to plaintiff's testimony. Referring to 
their relationship in Texas, plaintiff stated: 
Defendant denied there was ever a discussion about being 
partners. T. Vol. II, p. 82-83. 
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We both contributed everything. We 
contributed all of our finances, we 
contributed all of our time,' all of 
our talent, all of our efforts. R. 
Vol. I, p. 41 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff testified that, pursuant to the conversation 
in Pennsylvania, the parties were to combine their financial 
efforts. T. Vol. I, p. 55. 
Later on the plaintiff stated: 
It went - - we committed 100% of 
everything, our finances, our men-
tal, physical, emotional efforts up 
to the time that we separated. We 
still had a tremendous amount of 
contact after that up until Novem-
ber, 1982 and still a lot of finan-
cial involvement, talking, but the 
combination was not what it had been 
prior to separation. Prior to our 
separation it was 100%. T. Vol. I, 
p. 175-176. 
Plaintiff also stated that: 
We combined all of our income into our 
accounts, and all of our efforts, all 
of our energies into a common pool." 
T. Vol. I, p. 144.7 
The testimony of plaintiff, herself, indicates that her under-
standing of the "agreement" between herself and the defendant 
It is obvious, however, that the parties did not place all of 
their income in a common pool. Although the parties main-
tained a joint account in each of the States in which they 
resided, each also maintained a separate business account 
which was the exclusive property of that party. T. Vol. II, 
P. 96, 106, 110. Plaintiff, for instance, maintained the 
Robin Hough, Occupational Therapist Account in Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Montana, Colorado and Utah. T. Vol. I, p. 
111-115. EX. 57, 68, 72. 
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required her to contribute not only her time and talents, but 
also her finances to their union. 
B. Plaintifffs obligation did not change. There is no 
testimony anywhere in the record to support the court's finding 
that the plaintiff's contribution was limited to time and talent 
while defendant assumed the obligation of contributing money. In 
fact, the testimony is precisely to the contrary. When asked, 
"Did the agreement ever change, so far as you understood it? 
Plaintiff responded, "Never." T. Vol. I, p. 44. Thus, if the 
original agreement between the parties was that they would both 
o 
commit their total time, effort and talents and if that agree-
ment never changed, the Court's Finding No. 6 that the agreement 
did change and that defendant somehow became obligated to put up 
the money while plaintiff only had to provide "time and talent" 
is clearly erroneous. 
Ill 
IF THERE WAS A PARTNERSHIP, THE COURT ERRED IN 
DISTRIBUTING THE NET PROCEEDS OF SALE ON A 50-50 BASIS 
Defendant submits that the distribution of the proceeds 
of sale on a 50-50 basis is contrary to the Utah Partnership Act 
and in this case is patently inequitable to defendant. 
A. Partnership distributions are controlled by statute. 
The rules governing the rights and duties of partners are set 
Defendant denied that there ever was such an agreement; 
rather, he stated that, the parties were each to pursue their 
own careers. T. Vol. II, p. 105-106, 191. 
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forth in Section 48-1-15 U.C.A. That section provides that in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary: 
* 
1. Each partner will be repaid his contributions 
either by way of capital or advances to the 
partnership property and share equally in the 
profits and surplus remaining after all liabi-
lities are satisfied; and that the partners 
should contribute towards the losses in 
accordance to their share of the profits; 
2. The partnership must indemnify every partner 
with respect to payments made and personal 
liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the 
ordinary and proper conduct of its business or 
in the preservation of its business or 
property; 
3. A partner who, in aid of the partnership, 
makes any payments or advances beyond the 
amount of capital which he agreed to contri-
bute, shall be paid interest from the date of 
the payment or advance. 
Defendant submits that it is error and is contrary to 
§48-1-15 U.C.A. for the court in this case to divide the proceeds 
of sale equally between the parties. In Knutson v. Lauer 627 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1981), this Court reiterated that the partnership 
must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and 
personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary 
and proper conduct of business, or for the preservation of 
property. 
In Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 122 
(1958), this Court held that it was error for the district court 
to distribute "profits" without first indemnifying each of the 
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partners for their payments and advances on behalf of the 
partnership and without first repaying the sums owing in respect 
to capital. Each partner has the right, as between partners, to 
be repaid advances and to be indemnified in respect to payments 
made and personal liabilities incurred. 1 S. Rowley, supra §34 
at 767. 
The rules for distribution upon a dissolution of a 
partnership are set forth in Section 48-1-37 U.C.A. According to 
that section the liabilities of the partnership rank in the order 
of payment as follows: 
1. Those owing to creditors other than partners; 
2. Those owing to partners other than for capital 
and profits; 
3. Those owing to partners in respect of capital; 
and 
4. Those owing to partners in respect of profits. 
That section further provides that partners shall con-
tribute the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities of the 
partnership. 
B. A substantial portion of the funds to purchase the 
properties were borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's 
corporation. The method of acquisition of the properties by the 
parties was for defendant to borrow a"portion of the funds from 
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the retirement trust of his professional corporation* T. Vol. 
II, p» 132, 306. The notes signed by defendant, payable to the 
pension trust, Ex. 94, represent a substantial obligation of the 
Q 
partnership, if there was a partnership. Plaintiff's own Ex. 28 
acknowledged that, as of December 30, 1980, there was at least 
$54,630.00 owed to the Joel E. Colley, M.D., P.C., Retirement 
Trust, secured by second mortgages on the properties with 
interest payable annually at 12% to 15%. By 1981, defendant had 
borrowed $104,820.55 from the retirement trust for the proper-
ties. Ex. 29, T. Vol. II, p. 330. The court, however, refused 
to order the repayment of those funds except in the instances 
where a mortgage had also been signed by plaintiff. If the trial 
court's decision is allowed to stand/ those obligations will have 
to be repaid by defendant personally, without any contribution by 
plaintiff, or else defendant will have to pay $60,000 to $80,000 
in taxes. T. Vol. II, p. 330-331. 
C. Defendant paid a substantial sum from his own pocket 
to preserve the subject properties. After the parties separated 
the defendant was required to advance $146,247.00, for the pur-
pose of preserving the subject properties. T. Vol. II, p. 
Because of the nature of the profit sharing plan, defendant 
was the only one authorized by the plan to borrow funds from 
it. T. Vol. II, p. 132. 
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172-173; Ex. 111. During that same period of time the 
plaintiff paid a miserly $4f200.00 for property maintenance. T. 
Vol. I, p. 173* In addition, the unrefuted testimony of Mr. 
Miller, the accountant, showed that during the relationship, 
defendant contributed approximately $228,356.48, more than plain-
tiff. Ex. 111. That figure is most generous to plaintiff giving 
her credit for contributions of $101,489.76, the maximum amount 
that she could have contributed to the relationship during that 
period of time, although only $61,000.00 worth of deposits from 
plaintiff to the joint account were located by Mr. Miller. 
Defendant, on the other hand, had verified contributions of at 
least $394,312.00. T. Vol. II, p. 338-341. 
D. There was no agreement that plaintiff would be com-
pensated in wages or for the time spent in the partnership. 
Plaintiff testified that there was no agreement that she would be 
compensated for any services she provided in the management of 
the properties. T. Vol. I, p. 146-147. This Court has recog-
nized that a partner is not entitled to any remuneration for its 
services in the absence of an agreement by the partners to that 
effect. Knutson v. Lauer, supra, Chambers v. Simms, 13 Utah 2d 
371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962). In Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 
P.2d 118 (1953), this Court stated that, as a matter of law, 
Of those funds, $119,581 was paid from January 1, 1982 to 
December 31, 1984, the balance was paid during November and 
December 1981. T. Vol. II, p. 340. 
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partners receive no compensation for acting in the partnership 
business other than splitting the profits unless there is an 
express agreement or provision for such remuneration* Utah Law 
provides that no partner is entitled to remuneration for acting 
in the partnership's affairs. Section 48-1-15(6) U.C.A. It is 
clear, therefore, that plaintiff has no entitlement to any wages 
or remuneration since there was no agreement between the parties 
that she would be so compensated. As a result, if there was a 
partnership, and if plaintiff is entitled to a distribution from 
that partnership, it must come pursuant to either §48-1-15 or 
§48-1-37 LLC.A, 
Applying those rules to the instant case, the obliga-
tions other than those owed to partners must first be paid; 
thereafter, the obligations to partners other than for capital 
and profits must be paid. It is only after those obligations are 
paid that capital contributions are repaid and it is only after 
capital is paid that any profits are distributed. Knutson v. 
Lauer, supra; Eardley v. Sammons, supra. Thus, the money owed to 
the retirement trust, Ex. 94, must be repaid first, as an obliga-
tion owed to a creditor. Next, the plaintiff must be reimbursed 
for his advances, Ex. Ill, and then the capital contributions are 
returned. The court made no finding, however, concerning the 
amount contributed by the parties, and plaintiff presented no 
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evidence in that regard. Thus, an essential element of plain-
tiff's case was lacking.11 In Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313, 
(Alaska 1964), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the plain-
tiff, an unmarried "spouse", had the burden of showing not only 
the combined monetary amount contributed by the parties toward 
the purchase price of the property but also the precise amount 
contributed by herself. Failing that, she was not entitled to a 
portion of the property. In Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 152, 40 
N.W.2d 649 (1950), the court held that the burden of providing an 
accounting is upon the plaintiff in a partnership dissolution and 
if there is no proof the claim must fail. Plaintiff did not meet 
her burden. The only evidence of contribution was presented by 
defendant which showed that his personal contribution exceeded 
plaintiff's by $228,356.48, without considering the funds he 
personally borrowed from the retirement trust. If there was a 
partnership, he should be indemnified by plaintiff for his excess 
contributions. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEVOTE ALL OF HER TIME, TALENT 
AND ENERGIES TO THE SUBJECT UNION 
The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not devote all 
of her time, talents and energies to the "union"; rather, plain-
tiff was vigorously pursuing her own career, first in occupa-
Defendant moved for dismissal but the court denied his 
motion. T. Vol, II, p. 76. 
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tional therapy and then in real estate. The parties lived 
separate livesf took separate vacations and existed in their own 
separate spheres. T. Vol. II, p. 105y 137. Jean Wertz, the next 
door neighbor, testified that plaintiff and defendant came and 
went separately and that on only rare occasions were they seen 
together. T. Vol. II, p. 193-197. Defendant testified that al-
though he assisted plaintiff in becoming a licensed real estate 
person their relationship was such that she actively pursued her 
career and he pursued his. T. Vol. II, p. 128. Defendant stated 
"our careers kept us going separately." T. Vol. II, p. 181. 
The plaintiff testified that she had foregone "some" 
commissions with relation to some of the parcels of property that 
had been purchased but she could not identify the amount of com-
mission nor the specific parcels of property on which no commis-
sion was received. T. Vol. I, p. 68-69. Further, plaintiff had 
no idea concerning the cost of maintenance or the negative cash 
flow generated by the properties. T. Vol. I, p. 100-101. She 
could not state how much, if any, of her income went into the 
"property account." T. Vol, I, p. 134. In short, any evidence 
that she knew anything about the properties or that she had de-
voted any substantial portion of her time to their acquisition or 
maintenance was totally lacking. In fact, the plaintiff admitted 
that a property manager was hired shortly after her first real 
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estate sale and that within a few months the manager was not only 
collecting the rents but also writing the checks to the mortgage 
company and doing most, if not all, of the accounting. T. Vol. 
I, p. 59, 71-72. 
It is obvious, therefore, that for a considerable time 
prior to separation, plaintiff had no active management of the 
properties. There is no evidence that she contributed any sub-
stantial services to those properties and certainly there is no 
evidence that plaintiff devoted all her time and talents to the 
property during any period of their relationship. After October 
30r 1981, plaintiff made no effort to devote any time or energy 
to the properties. As defendant stated, "She just left." T. 
Vol. II, p. 175. Thereafter, plaintiff's efforts were directed 
solely toward the acquisition of wealth and personal gratifica-
tion. T. Vol. II, p. 313, Ex. 73-76, 86-91, 100-104.12 The 
defendant, meanwhile, was forced to maintain the properties by 
advancing additional funds for mortgage payments, property main-
tenance, and other expenses. Ex. 111. 
A. Plaintiff did not account for all of the funds she 
received. During 1981, plaintiff kept, from her broker, Gump & 
For example, during November 21, 1983 through November 25, 
1983, plaintiff was variously "laying in bed with Curtis or 
laying in front of the fireplace with Curtis", a school 
teacher from Connecticut. Ex. 91 p. 102-103. 
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Ayers, a $6,450.00 commission obtained from a real estate deal, 
and put that money into her own pocket. T. Vol. II, p. 260-261, 
Ex. 78. Plaintiff admitted so doing. T. Vol. I. p. 149. The 
plaintiff did not tell the defendant about the commission because 
she knew that defendant would want her to use the money to repay 
the loans from the retirement trust. T. Vol. II, p. 260-261. 
Mr. Ronald Radcliffe testified that he and plaintiff 
began working on a transaction relating to property located in 
Cedar Valley, Utah in 1980 or 1981; a date clearly prior to the 
time the parties separated. For that transaction, plaintiff 
received $20,000.00 in cash as a "management fee" which funds 
were also kept by plaintiff and not paid to Gump & Ayers or used 
to repay the debts relating to the properties. T. Vol. I, p. 
149-150. In addition, plaintiff will continue to receive $500.00 
per month for a period of sixty (60) months for "management" of 
the properties. Mr. Radcliffe testified, however, the plaintiff 
does nothing for that fee. 
It is obvious that plaintiff, on at least two occasions, 
purloined real estate commissions that should have rightfully 
13 been paid to her broker. Although plaintiff contended that 
the consulting fee was received after the parties separated, it 
Plaintiff testified that there was no difference between what 
she did to earn the "consulting" fee and what she would do to 
earn a regular real estate commission. T. Vol. I, p. 150. 
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was reported on her 1981 tax return* Ex. 1, 1981 Return, p. 8 of 
computer statement. In any event, since the plaintiff began 
working on the transaction prior to the date of separation, it 
should be considered "work-in-process" for the "unit." Once the 
fees were received by plaintiff, however, rather than contribute 
them to the maintenance of the properties, as defendant did with 
his income, she used them for the acquisition of personal assets. 
During 1982, plaintiff purchased a new Mercedes automo-
bile for $28,000.00 cash, T. Vol. I, p. 130, a residence on 
Kentucky Avenue, several rental properties, entered into various 
partnerships with others for the acquisition of real property, T. 
Vol> I, p« 128-130, and spent $10,000.00 - $15,000.00 remodeling 
her newly purchased home. During 1982, plaintiff also traveled 
to Portland, Oregon, and Sydney, Australia, went on a fishing 
trip to Montana, and visited her parents in Fort Worth, Texas. 
R. 269. According to the figures of Mr. Miller, the accountant, 
plaintiff's spendable income for 1982 was $31,543.00. Ex. 115. 
If one adds up the expenditures acknowledged by plaintiff, with-
out even taking into account her ordinary living expenses for 
that year, it is obvious that in 1982 the plaintiff spent a sum 
of cash substantially in excess of $31,543.00. The only logical 
explanation for plaintiff's wealth and style of living in 1982 is 
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that she had, for a substantial amount of time, been sequestering 
funds from her real estate business and not contributing them to 
the "unit". Obviously, plaintiff was not devoting all of her 
time and energy to the "partnership" as the court found she was 
obligated to do. 
B. Plaintiff has acquired substantial assets in her own 
name rather than supporting the subject properties. Besides the 
home, rental properties, and partnerships, plaintiff owns a Keogh 
Plan, an IRA Plan, several Dean Witter accounts, receives the 
$500 per month management fee and is also well established in her 
real estate profession. T. Vol. I, p. 128-130. These assets 
were all acquired prior to the date the court terminated the 
partnership. Thus, while defendant was putting his own money 
into the preservation of the properties, plaintiff was acquiring 
properties of her own and making deposits into her Keogh and IRA 
accounts. In fact, the evidence showed that at the end of 1983, 
plaintiff had approximately $42,000.00 in her IRA account, 
$29,000.00 in her Keogh account and $14,000.00 in her E.F. Hutton 
account. Ex. 102 to 104. Plaintiff testified that she made 
regular deposits to those accounts. T. Vol. I, p. 203. Plain-
tiff clearly had the ability to contribute towards the properties 
if she had chosen to do so. See Ex. 100-101. Rather than help-
ing the defendant, the plaintiff diminished the defendant's 
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ability to preserve the properties by filing Lis Pendens on all 
of them, thereby making them unsaleable* T. Vol. II, p. 312, R. 
8-18. In addition, during that time, plaintiff also kept 
approximately $5,100.00 from the proceeds of a parcel of property 
located on Seventh East, although the checks were made payable to 
plaintiff and defendant, jointly. T. Vol. II, p. 58, Ex. 81. 
Plaintiff admitted signing defendant's name to the checks, T. 
Vol. I. p. 104. 
C. A distribution to plaintiff based upon her time, 
talents and services is in error. If plaintiff is entitled to a 
share of the profits, such a distribution is subordinate to a 
return of defendant's advances and capital. As Rowley has 
stated: 
Where one partner has contributed 
capital and another services, the 
one contributing the capital is 
entitled to withdraw its value. 
1 S. Rowley, supra at 453. 
While under some circumstances personal services may 
constitute a capital contribution to a partnership, there must be 
an agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner who contributes 
services is not entitled to share in the partnership capital upon 
dissolution. Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1983). 
14 In the instant case there was no evidence of such an agreement. 
See Section II of this Brief. 
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It has been stated: A partner contributing only ser-
vices and no capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share of 
capital on dissolution, the capital is returned to the partner 
supplying it. Tiffany v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939 
(1943). The partner contributing only services is limited to his 
share of the profits of the enterprise as compensation for his 
services. Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, modified 
on other grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944). 
Generally where one partner contributes the capital of 
the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the partner 
who made the capital contribution is entitled, on dissolution, to 
repayment of such capital before any distribution of profits is 
made. A partner who furnishes no capital, but who contributes 
merely his time, skill and services, is not entitled on dissolu-
tion to any part of the original firm capital, but must look for 
his compensation for such time and services to his share of the 
profits. Vassallo v. Sexauer, 22 Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 
(1970); Bass v. Daetwyler, 305, S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v 
McBride, supra. 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to determine 
whether or not there were any profits to distribute and further 
erred in failing to return to defendant the capital he had con-
tributed. Section 48-1-37 U.C.A. There was no competent 
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evidence that the parties had agreed that plaintiff could contri-
bute services in lieu of cash. Plaintiff presented no account-
ing to the Court showing what services she rendered, the amount 
of time involved or the value of what she did. In other 
words, there was no basis upon which the Court could evaluate 
plaintiff's contribution to the "unit", nor could the Court 
properly determine that the financial contribution of defendant 
was matched by the efforts and services of plaintiff. 
Although one who provides only services to a partnership 
may be entitled to a division of profitsy no such division is 
proper until after all obligations have been paid and all contri-
butions and advances have been returned. 
Plaintiff relied upon the case of Craig v. Hamilton, 518 
P.2d 539 (Kan. 1984), for the proposition that even though her 
contribution to the "unit" was less than defendant's she wasf 
nevertheless, entitled to an equal distribution of the property. 
Such, however, is not the holding of that case. In that case 
there was a written partnership agreement, therefore, the thresh-
old issue presented in this case, i.e., the existence of a part-
nership, was not in dispute. That agreement provided that two of 
See Section II of this Brief. 
Defendant testified that plaintiff did nothing to maintain or 
oversee the properties. T. Vol. II, p. 191. 
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the partners would contribute "equipment, technical knowledge, 
skill and experience," and Hamilton would contribute cash. Upon 
dissolution, Hamilton was offered his capital contribution plus 
10% of the profits. Hamilton contended, however, and the court 
there found, that he was entitled to an equal share, or one-
third, of the profits. 
Unlike the trial court here, the Kansas court recognized 
that the partners were entitled to a return of capital before 
profits were distributed. 
The trial court's award to plaintiff of one-half of the 
proceeds from the sale of the real property is clearly error. 
V 
THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITORS IS 
ONE OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN UTAH 
Assuming that there is no partnership, the underlying 
issue in this case then becomes what, if any, rights or obliga-
tions do unmarried cohabitating parties have in Utah with 
relation to property acquired and obligations incurred during, or 
as a result of, that cohabitation. 
Plaintiff's theories of recovery, other than common law 
marriage, were partnership and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff 
presented no evidence, however, relating to the unjust enrichment 
claim. 
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Over the years, various theories have been advanced in 
an attempt to adjudicate the rights of unmarried, cohabitating 
adults. The most prominent case is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 
660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), wherein the plain-
tiff alleged an express contract with the defendant contending, 
inter alia, that she gave up a lucrative career so that she could 
provide domestic services to defendant in exchange for defen-
dant's promise of support* In the instant case, however, the 
plaintiff does not claim an agreement for future support. In 
addition, she performed none of the traditional wifely duties. 
Household chores were done by a maid, cleaning lady and various 
other people. T. Vol. II, p. 182. The plaintiff did not assist 
the defendant in furthering his medical career. T. Vol. II, p. 
737. Rather, the plaintiff enhanced her own career through the 
efforts of the defendant. T. Vol. I, p. 70-71, 152; Vol. II, p. 
124-125. 
In Marvin, the court upheld the claim of an express 
contract and further stated that the plaintiff could, if she 
wished, amend her complaint to also allege an implied agreement 
of partnership. In deciding an analogous case, however, the New 
York Court of Appeals flatly rejected the implied contract theory 
of Marvin finding it: 
to be conceptually so amorphous as practically to 
defy equitable enforcement and inconsistent with 
the legislative policy enunciated in 1933 when 
common-law marriages were abolished in New York. 
Monroe v. Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 
1980. 
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The New York court did, however, state it would recognize an 
express contract for domestic services. Id. at 441. 
In Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 903 
(1979) the court rejected the partnership theory in a case 
between unmarried adults who had cohabitated for 15 years but did 
find an express agreement for future support based on the facts 
17 
of that case. 
It was held in Chambers v. Crawford, 150 So.2d 61 
(La. App. 1963), that where the initial motive and purpose of the 
parties1 coming together was cohabitation and where such rela-
tionship continued, there was no right of recovery based upon the 
theory of a partnership. 
It thus appears that, except for the gratuitous comments 
in Harvin, the application of partnership principles between 
unmarried cohabitants has been generally rejected, unless all of 
the requirements of an express partnership agreement are clearly 
met. 
A. An award to plaintiff would be contrary to the 
public policy in the State of Utah. The claim of a "partnership" 
by plaintiff is really a back door approach to a common law 
marriage since the issue here, as in most common law marriages, 
Much of that opinion was founded upon the Illinois Court of 
Appeals decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454 (111. 
Ct.App. 1978), which was subsequently reversed by its 
Supreme Court. 
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is that of money, not matrimony. If plaintiff is allowed to 
prevail on her claim of entitlement to any of the property, 
without making a significant contribution to its acquisition, it 
would be tantamount to establishing common law marriage in the 
State of Utah, at least for economic purposes. 
In Rehak v, Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977), 
the alleged "wife" brought an action in equity for a portion of 
the property acquired during 18 years of cohabitation. Affirming 
a dismissal by the trial court, the Supreme Court stated: 
It is well settled that neither a 
court of law nor a court of equity 
will lend its aid to either party to 
a contract founded upon an illegal 
or immoral consideration . • . The 
parties being unmarried and the 
appellant having admitted the fact 
of cohabitation . . . this would 
constitute immoral consideration. 
See also, Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 
(1958). 
The plaintiff has admitted that she and the defendant 
lived together, and that they had sexual intercourse together 
prior to the time of any "agreement." T. Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74. 
She further admitted that the "agreement" to become "partners" 
was arrived at after they started living together. T. Vol. I, p. 
193. It appears, therefore, that plaintiff's claim is similarly 
based on immoral consideration and should have been dismissed. 
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Another case in point is Hewitt v, Hewittf 77 111. 2d 
49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). There the Illinois Supreme Court met 
head on the various philosophies of the case of Marvin v. Marvin, 
supra. In Hewitt, the plaintiff was an unmarried mother of three 
who sued the children's father, with whom she had lived for 15 
years, to recover an equal share of the property accumulated by 
the parties during that period. Unlike the instant case, the 
plaintiff there claimed that she had devoted her efforts to the 
defendant's professional education and the establishment of his 
practice. The Illinois Supreme Court, nevertheless, held that 
the woman's claim was unenforceable for the reason that it 
contravened the public policy of the state which disfavored the 
grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly un-
married cohabitants. Noting that common law marriages in 
Illinois are invalid, the Court observed, that Illinois "appears 
to be one of the three states retaining fault grounds for disso-
lution of marriage." Id. at 1210. The court went on to state 
that "certainly a significantly stronger pro-marriage policy is 
manifest in that action (fault grounds for marriage dissolution) 
which appears to reaffirm the traditional doctrine that marriage 
is a civil contract between three parties - the husband, the wife 
and the state." "This seems to us", the court continued, 
"another indication that public policy disfavors private contrac-
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tual alternatives to marriage." Id. The Illinois Supreme Court 
was concerned that the practical effect of allowing the "wife" to 
recover would be the reinstatement of common law marriage. Id. 
at 1211. Citing to Marvin and other similar cases, the court 
stated that commentators have expressed the concern that "the 
effect of these cases is to reinstate common law marriage in 
California after it has been abolished by the legislature." The 
Illinois Court criticized the approach utilized by the California 
Court in Marvin and stated that the issue of whether property 
rights accrued to unmarried cohabitants cannot be regarded real-
istically as merely a contract law problem: 
There are major public policy 
questions involved in determining 
whetherf under what circumstancesf 
and to what extent it is desirable 
to accord some type of legal status 
to claims arising from such rela-
tionships. Of substantially greater 
importance than the rights of the 
immediate parties, is the impact of 
such recognition upon our society 
and the institution of marriage. 
Id. at 1207. 18 
Further the Court stated thatf with relation to Marvin: 
it would seem more candid to acknow-
ledge the return of varying forms of 
common law marriage then to continue 
displaying the naivete we believe 
The Court was concerned that if legal rights closely 
resembling those arising from conventional marriages can be 
acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into 
illicit or meritorious relationships, the formation of such 
relationships might be encouraged and that might weaken the 
marriage foundation of our family based society. 
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involved in the assertion that there 
are involved in these relationships 
contracts separate and independent 
from the sexual activity. Id. at 
1209. 
Continuing the Court stated: 
the issue, realistically, is whether 
it is appropriate for this Court to 
grant a legal status to a private 
arrangement substituting for the 
institution of marriage sanctioned 
by the state. Id. 
That is the issue squarely before this Court. 
Defendant believes that the policy considerations out-
lined by the Illinois Supreme Court are also applicable to the 
State of Utah and that the reasoning of the Hewitt court should 
be adopted here. The State of Utah is a strong family based 
based society and has a firm policy favoring marriage. In Hilton 
v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902), this Court observed 
that "marriage is the foundation of civilization and of the 
social system." Id. at 663. The State of Utah has refused to 
adopt the concept of no fault dissolution of marriage and is, 
19 
with Illinois, one of the few remaining States, to do so. At 
the turn of the century, this Court stated that the marriage 
contract is not subject, like other contracts, to dissolution by 
mutual consent of the parties, or in any other way, except 
The other State is South Dakota. 
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through the sovereign power of the state. Hilton v. Roylancey 
supra. That strong and continuing public policy was reaffirmed in 
1986 when the State Senate rejected a bill that would have added 
irreconcilable differences to the grounds for divorce in Utah. 
Minutes of Judiciary Standing Committee, Utah State Senate, Feb. 
3, 1986y H.B. 33. Utah does not allow common law marriages. 
Hendrich v. Anderson, 191 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1951); Johnson v. 
Johnsonf 116 Utah 27, 207 P.2d 1036 (1949); In re Vetas' Estate, 
110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946).20 Although leniency is often 
shown to unmarried "spouses" in workmen's compensation cases in 
other jurisdictions. See, H. Clark, supra, p. 50, this Court has 
consistently refused to do so. Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm., 712 
P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); Wengert v. Double 00 Hot Shot, 657 P.2d 
21 1343 (Utah 1983). Thus, it is apparent that, as has 
Illinois, the State of Utah has consistently asserted a strong 
interest in the institution of marriage and of the family. See, 
In ret Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 572 P.2d 1028 (1973), Hilton v. 
The overwhelming trend in the United States is against common 
law marriages, H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, p. 45-46 
(1968) , which have often been characterized as a "fruitful 
source of perjury and fraud." See, Estate of Gavula, 417 
A.2d 168 (Pa. 1980). 
This Court stated that it has consistently held that a valid 
marriage is a prerequisite to receiving worker's death 
benefits. 
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Roylancef supra. It would be inappropriate, based upon the 
public policy of this state to afford legal status to claims 
arising from a meretricious relationship. If this Court allows 
the plaintiff to recover/ the defendant submits that that will be 
tantamount to sanctioning common law marriages for economic 
purposes and that it will promote illicit relationships and 
subvert the state's consistently asserted interest in the 
marriage relationship. 
B. Equity should not reward plaintiff. Defendant 
submits that it is inequitable to saddle him with all of the 
debts owed to the retirement trust. In addition, to allow 
plaintiff to just walk away and then utilize her income for the 
acquisition of personal assets while defendant was required to 
contribute a substantial sum towards the maintenance of the 
propertiesf and then for the court to refuse to require the 
plaintiff to repay defendant for his contributions is contrary to 
the basic principals of equity and fairness. 
1. Plaintiff does not come into court with clean 
hands. A portion of plaintiff's claim involved the willful vio-
lation of the criminal laws of this state. Section 76-7-104 
U.C.A.. The court's finding in Stevens v. Andersony 75 Ariz. 
331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953), that the unmarried, cohabitating 
parties had violated the "permanent public policy of all society 
and the express criminal statutes of the state" is applicable 
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here. In addition, plaintiff concealed a portion of her funds 
from defendant and refused to contribute toward the maintenance 
of the properties even though asked to do so. T. Vol. II, p. 
313. It cannot be said, therefore, that either before or after 
separation, she dealt with defendant in fairness and good con-
science; obviously, plaintiff's contributions to the relationship 
22 
were minimal, but the benefits she received were substantial. 
Plaintiff did not come into court with clean hands, therefore, 
equity should not assist her. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 
(Utah 1976). 
2. If plaintiff is entitled to anything at all, 
it should be in proportion to the contribution she made to the 
properties. If equity dictates that plaintiff should receive 
something, she should be limited to the proportion that she con-
tributed to the acquisition and maintenance of the properties. 
Keller v. Prochey, 560 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1977); Bruck v. Howe, 71 
S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744 (1946); Stevens v. Anderson, supra. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning the amount she contri-
buted, however, defendant's figures showed that his contribution 
was substantially greater than plaintiff's. Ex. 111. If plain-
tiff is entitled to a distribution it must be reduced by the pay-
ments made by defendant after separation. As has been stated: 
See Section IV of this Brief. 
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Unless otherwise agreedf a person 
who has discharged more than his 
proportionate share of a duty owed 
by himself and another • . • is 
entitled to contribution from the 
other. Restatement, Restitutionf 
§81 (1937). 
CONCLUSION 
There was no partnership. If there was a partnership 
any distribution should be pursuant to statute. There is no 
basis in the record to support the conclusion that the plaintiff 
was only to provide services but that the defendant was to 
provide the money. In any event, defendant should be entitled to 
his direct capital contributionsf and the other funds advanced, 
before plaintiff receives anything. An award to plaintiff under 
these circumstances is contrary to the public policy of the State 
of Utah. Plaintiff did not come to court with clean hands, did 
not contribute equally to the acquisition of the properties and, 
in fact, amassed substantial wealth at the expense of defendant. 
Equity should, therefore, deny plaintiff any relief. The 
judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff one-half of the 
properties must be reversed. 
DATED this Ifi day of April, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^sJJMMMjLL 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
uoa/e^^ 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-15 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an 
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he 
is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them 
to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner 
in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where 
all the members of an existing partnership consent to the representation, 
a partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint 
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the 
representation. 
History: L. 1S21, ch. 89, 416, && 
C. 1943,69-1-13, 
There was no partnership or joint adven-
ture by estoppel where one of the two alleged 
joint adventurers had not given his consent 
to "being held out as a joint adventurer with 
the person making the representation, and 
where the third person to whom the repre-
sentation had been made had not relied upon 
it Bates v. Simpson (1962) 121 U 166, 239 P 
2d 749. 
Partnership liability to mechanics1 lienors 
was found where defendant had stated to 
others he was or intended to become anoth-
er's partner, and where he paid for a part of 
the material used and was present during the 
delivery and use of construction materials on 
the premises. Buehner Block Co. v. Gleaos 
(1967) 6 U 2d 226,310 P 2d 517. 
That payment for goods was made by 
check on the account of defendant, that 
defendant waa sometimes listed as a pur* 
chaser on the sales invoices, that defendant 
signed applications for licenses to engage in 
business with the state tax commission was 
not sufficient basis for reversal of trial court 
finding that defendant was not liable as a 
partner in an enterprise by estoppel. Phillips 
Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam (1973) 29 U 2d 
69, 604 P 2d 1376. 
Collateral References, 
Partnership <£=» 24. 
68 CJS Partnership { 21. 
69 AmJur 2d 982 to 989, Partnership }( 67 
to 76. 
48-1-14. Liability of incoming partner. A person admitted as a part* 
ner into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the part-
nership arising before his admission as if he had been a partner when such 
obligations were incurred, except that his liability shall be satisfied only 
out of partnership property. 
History: L 1921, ch. 89, 417; R.S. 1983 4 
C. 1943,69-1*14, 
Collateral References. 
Partnership «=> 288. 
68 CJS Partnership 1266. 
60 AmJur U 123» Partnership 4 212. 
Duty of one who joins with others aa part-
ners or members of a joint adventure in the 
purchase of property from a third person to 
share with them the benefit of an existing 
option or executory contract for the property, 
152 ALR 1001. 
Liability of incoming partner for existing 
debts, 46 ALR 1240. 
Right of one who accepts firm assets or 
obligation upon account of an individual 
indebtedness of, or transaction with, a part-
ner, 50 ALR 4SL 
48-1*15* Rules determining righto and duties of partners* The rights 
and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be deter-
mined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of 
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the 
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to part-
ners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capi-





(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of pay-
ments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the 
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its 
business or property. 
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or 
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall 
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance. 
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him 
only from the date when repayment should be made. 
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of 
the partnership business. 
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compen-
sation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs. 
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the con-
sent of all the partners. 
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the 
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but 
no act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be 
done rightfully without the consent of all the partners. 
to his son and wife of certain amounts of the 
capital contributions he had made to the 
partnership, and intended that such gift be 
accomplished by each partner's sharing 
according to respective partnership interests, 
in the total assets of the partnership includ-
ing the contributions made by the father, 
and the other partners relied on such gift, 
the intention of the parties was conclusive 
and subd. (1) of this section was inapplicable. 
West v. West (1965) 16 U 2d 411,403 P 2d 22. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, i 18; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943,69-1-15. 
Construction and application. 
An organization of workers, formed for the 
purpose of performing and undertaking con-
tracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the 
essential elements of either a general or lim-
ited partnership, where all the equipment 
used by workers belonged to one individual 
who had sole authority to make contracts for 
himself and the organization, and where 
workers were not entitled to share in profits 
equally or on any fixed percentage basis, 
were not chargeable for losses, nor permitted 
to determine the means or methods of oper-
ating. Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of 
Review Industrial Comm. (1950) 118 U 384, 
222 P 2d 563. 
Extra compensation. 
Where there was no express or implied 
agreement existing aa to the partners' wagea 
or compensation, it was not error for the 
trial court to exclude evidence that one part-
ner did more work than the other, for part-
ners receiye no compensation for action in 
the partnership business (other than split-
ting the profits) unless there was an express 
agreement or provision for such remunera-
tion. Keller v. Wixom (1953) 123 U 103, 255 P 
2d 118. 
Gifts to members of family. 
Where father intended at the time of dis-
solution of family partnership to make a gift 
Remuneration for services. 
Where the partnership agreement or a spe-
cific practice, acquiesced to by the partners, 
contemplates the payment of salary to one or 
more partners, but no amounta are specified, 
it is presumed that payment of reasonable 
salaries is intended. Chambers v. Sims (1962) 
13 U 2d 371,374 P 2d 841. 
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any 
remuneration for his services in the absence 
of an agreement by the partners to that 
effect Chambers v. Sims (1962) 13 U ad 371, 
374 P 2d 841. 
Sharing profits and leasee. 
Although obligation to share losses is not 
directly expressed in partnership agreement, 
generally agreement to share profits, nothing 
being said about losses, amounta prima facie 
to agreement to share loasea also. Bentley •. 
Brossard (1908) 33 U 396,94 P 736. 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-37 
48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud or misrep-
resentation. Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of 
the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party enti-
tled to rescind is, without prejudice to any other right, entitled: 
(1) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership 
property, after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons, for 
any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the part-
nership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and, 
(2) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied, 
in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made 
by him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and, 
(3) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the 
representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership. 
History; L 1921, ch. SS, 9 8$ R.S. 1S83 4 60 AraJur 2d 110, 119, Partnership i t 197, 
C. 1943, 09-1-36. 207. 
Collateral Rafaranoaa, Right of on* partner to maintain action at 
Partnership 4fc» 26. law against the other for damages from 
68 CJS Partnership f 13. wrongful dissolution of firm, 4 ALR 168. 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution* In settling accounts between the part-
ners after dissolution the following rules shall be observed, subject to any 
agreement to the contrary: 
(1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all 
the liabilities specified in subdivision (2) of this section. 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, 
as follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in sub-
section (1) of this section to the satisfaction of the liabilities. 
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by section 48-1-15 (1) the 
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the 
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contrib-
ute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and 
in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the additional 
amount necessary to pay the liabilities. 
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed 
by the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in 
subsection (4) of this section. 
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to 





extent of the amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the liabil-
ity. 
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the 
contributions specified in subsection (4) of this section. 
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the 
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership cred-
itors shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on 
individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as hereto-
fore. 
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the 
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order. 
(a) Those owing to separate creditors. 
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors. 
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-37. 
Collection on partnership judgment. 
Where partners conducted business with-
out books and took money from partnership 
for living expenses, partner couid not be 
charged with money collected on a partner-
ship judgment on dissolution of partnership, 
in absence of evidence that it was appropri-
ated to his own use for other than living 
expenses. Buzianis v. Buzianis (1932) 81 U 1, 
16 P 2d 413. 
Credits. 
Where contribution of one partner 
exceeded that of other partner and he bor-
rowed certain money from his wife for pur-
pose of purchasing property for partnership, 
on dissolution, he was entitled to credit for 
such excess and for money borrowed, 
together with interest, until date of termina-
tion of partnership. Buzianis v. Buzianis 
(1932) 81 U l , 16 P 2d 413. 
Descent and distribution. 
Title to property which was in partner at 
date of his death descends as real estate to 
his heira subject only to equity of surviving 
partner to have it applied primarily to trust 
for which it was acquired. Bankers' Trust Co. 
v. Riter (1920) 56 U 525,190 P 1113. 
Goodwill. 
A partnership of certified public accoun-
tants is of the same nature as a partnership 
of attorneys or physicians and has no 
goodwill to be accounted for as an asset upon 
dissolution in absence of provision in part-
nership agreement relating to goodwill. Jack-
son v. Caldwell (1966) 18 U 2d 81, 415 P 2d 
667. 
Where goodwill was not carried as an asset 
on partnership books and partnership agree-
ment did not contemplate that goodwill be 
included in book value of partnership, it was 
proper to exclude goodwill as an item requir-
ing an accounting by one partner to another 
upon dissolution. Jackson v. Caldwell (1966) 
18 U 2d 81,415 P 2d 667. 
Money in bank. 
In determining respective rights of part-
ners upon dissolution of partnership, it was 
held that money in the bank, which receiver 
had taken charge of, was improperly included 
in the computation of total receipts. Wardrop 
v. Harrison (1924) 63 U 132,222 P1069. 
Money invested. 
Where evidence supported finding that 
partner sent money to Greece for purpose of 
purchasing Greek francs, he was properly 
charged with such money on dissolution, 
together with interest to date of termination 
of partnership. Buzianis v. Buzianis (1932) 81 
U l , 1 6 P 2 d 4 i a 
Refunds to partnership. 
Under contract dissolving partnership 
engaged in obtaining refunds of excessive 
freight rates paid to railroads, partner leav-
ing partnership held entitled to percentage of 
fee in certain case, which claim was pending 
at time of dissolution, although refund 
obtained was on freight bills paid after part-
nership was dissolved. Gallacher v. Foubert 
(1934) 85 U13,38 P 2d 297. 
Collateral References. 
Partnership € » 300. 
68 CJS Partnership i 385. 
60 AmJur 2d 182, 198 to 208, 229, Partner-
ship » 280,301 to 316,340. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, t 
Plaintiff, s 
vs t 
JOEL E. COLLEY, : 
Defendant. i 
Memorandum Decision 
Civil No. DS2-3064 
This matter was tried before the court on February 6, 
1985. Written arguments have been submitted by each counsel. 
Both counsel have done ah exhaustive job in researching the 
law and an excellent job in presenting the facts. 
The parties commenced living together in Galveston. 
Texas, in August, 1972. Both were students and found 
initially that they could share expenses and save money by 
living together. They grew up in an era when living together 
was a vogue among many young people. The defendant obtained 
his medical degree and they moved from Texas to Pennsylvania 
to Montana to Colorado and to Utah. All of the foregoing 
states except Utah recognize a "common law marriage11. The 
first issue before the court is whether the parties have 
formed a common law marriage in any one of the jurisdictions. 
The elements of such a marriage appear to be substantially 
the same in each of these jurisdictions, namely, <1) the 
parties must have agreed between themselves to be married; 
AR 
(2) after such an agreement they must have lived together as 
man and wifej and (3) they must have held themselves out to 
the public as man and wife. Certainly, in this case there is 
no doubt that they lived together as man and wife. This 
court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden 
of proof as to the other two elements and therefore holds 
that there is no common law marriage. 
During their "relationship" the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate here in Utah. The court finds that 
as to this property the parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they were sharing equally in all of the 
property. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote her time and talent to the property and that the 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
« 
50-50. The partnership property consists of the followingi 
<1> 780 Northcliffe; (2) contract receivable on 1358 Roberta; 
(3) 382 Leslie; <4> 520 - 9th Avenue; <5) Deer valley lot; 
(6) 231 Browning; (7) 514 East Wilson; 770 South 7th East; 
<8) Flatfhead, Montana; <9> Hot Springs, Montana; (10) Nephi 
land; and (11) Spring Creek property. As to all other assets 
the court finds that the parties acquired these in their sole 
and separate property. The court finds that any funds put 
into these properties by the defendant were capital 
contributions matched by the efforts of the plaintiff. All 
of these properties should be liquidated and after paying any 
obligations to third parties the net proceeds should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
A6 
Under these circumstances neither attorney's fees nor 
costs should be awarded to either party. 
Dated this J_J__ day o-f March, 1985. 
^ - 2 ^ ~ W-
DearTl^. Conder, 
District Judge.. 
Copies of the foregoing to be mailed to each counsel. 
A7 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
VS. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO, D 82-3064 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
Defendant 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appear-
ing in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and wit-
nesses including the parties having been sworn and testified, 
and exhibits having been received and the matter having been 
argued and submitted, and the Court having received post-trial 
briefs and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there 
having been further argument on the interpretation and content 
of the Memorandum Decision, the Court now being fully advised, 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties commenced living together in Galveston, 
Texas, in August 19 72. Both were students and shared expenses 
and money by living together. They moved from Texas to Pennsyl-
vania, to Montana, to Colorado and to Utah. All the foregoing 
onir-?'? 
A8 
states except Utah recognizes common law marriage. The parties 
resided with each other until late October, 1981, when they 
separated. 
2. During the nine-year period, defendant completed 
his last year of medical school at the University of Texas, 
a one-year internship at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
two years of residency in anesthesiology at the University 
of Colorado and the University of Utah. During this time 
the plaintiff obtained her college degree in Occupational 
Therapy. The parties lived together, filed joint income tax 
returns and purchased property. They did not agree between 
themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold them-
selves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the re-
quirements of a common law marriage. The court finds that 
there was no common law marriage between these parties. 
3. During their relationship, the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate in the state of Utah and as to this 
property, the court finds the parties were partners under 
circumstances where each of the parties committed his or her 
total time, effort and talents to the partnership. This 
partnership is further evidenced by the manner in which the 
parties purchased the properties and held title and applica-
tions they filed for fidelity bonds in which they reflected 
their common ownership. 




5. On July 30, 1982, plaintiff filed this action for 
divorce. In June, 1983, plaintiff amended her complaint and 
also alleged that a partnership existed between plaintiff 
and defendant which partnership plaintiff requested be dissolved 
and that the assets of the partnership be equitably distributed. 
6. The court finds that as to the real estate holdings 
of the parties hereinafter set forth in the next following 
paragraph, the parties were partners with an agreed understanding 
that they would share equally in all the property and the 
proceeds thereon. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote all her time and talents to the property and 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
on an equal basis. 
7. The partnership property consists of the following: 
a. 780 Northcliffe, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
b. Contract receivable at 1358 Roberta, Salt Lake 
City, Utah; 
c. 382 Leslie, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
d. 520 - 9th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
e. Lot, Deer Valley, Utah; 
f. 231 Browning, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
g. 514 East Wilson, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
h. 770 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
i. Flathead, Montana; 
j. Hot Springs, Montana; 
k. Nephi# Utah; 
1. Spring Creek property. 
-3- *9 
As to all other assets acquired during the relationship 
of the parties, the court finds the parties acquired these 
as their sole and separate property and not in partnership 
except as to properties in which the parties expressly had 
a partnership agreement which includes a half-interest in 
a lot in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and a partnership relating to 
a duplex on the west side of Salt Lake City. 
8. The court further finds that as to any mortgages 
signed by both parties for monies loaned by defendant's profit 
sharing plan that said mortgages and liabilities thereon are 
to be recognized as valid. If there are mortgages signed 
only by the defendant, the court finds they are self-serving 
and do not constitute liabilities against the partnership 
assets. 
9. The partnership agreement between the parties relating 
to the assets provided in paragraph 7 above terminated upon 
the trial of this case, and any contributions made by either 
of the parties to that time should be deemed part of their 
common effort and matched by the efforts and services of the 
other party for which no further accounting should be required. 
10. Any funds put into the partnership by the defendant 
were capital contributions matched by the efforts of plaintiff. 





CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was no common law marriage between the parties, 
and the parties are not husband and wife, 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time shall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required• 
3. All the properties are ordered to be liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proceeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties. 
4. Plaintiff's first cause of action and all other causes 
based upon the existence of a common law marriage should be 
dismissed* 
5* No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
v DATED this ' ¥ day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
/ ^ C V ^ A A - -
DISTRJCT JUDGE 
. t : ix. T 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
VS. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
J U D G M E N T 
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appearing 
in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and witnesses 
including the parties having been sworn and testified, and 
exhibits having been received and the matter having been argued 
and submitted, and the court having received post-trial briefs 
and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there having 
been further argument on the interpretation and content of 
the Memorandum Decision, and the court now being fully advised 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action and all other causes 
of action based upon the existence of a common law marriage 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action. 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time shall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required. 
3. All the properties are ordered to be liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proeeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties, 
4. No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
p DATED this y Y day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
UH&*i 
-2-
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